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TAGS: [OSCE](#) [PREL](#) [PHUMK](#) [KDEM](#) [GG](#) [RS](#) [PL](#)

SUBJECT: POLAND SHARES U.S. CONCERNS ON OSCE MINISTERIAL

REF: A. STATE 125626

[B. WARSAW](#) 1346

Classified By: Political Counselor F. Daniel Sainz for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) The U.S. can rely on Polish support on the major issues of concern at the December 4-5 Helsinki ministerial meeting -- the Russian European security treaty initiative, Georgia, and the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). Jacek Emmel in the MFA Security Policy Department told us that Polish positions on these issues were similar to those of the U.S. The most difficult aspect of the ministerial for Poland will be to influence the debate without being perceived as overly critical of Russia.

¶2. (C) On a ministerial declaration, Emmel said the draft was comprehensive and, despite some relatively weak references to Georgia and the Medvedev European security treaty initiative, Poland could "live with it" in its current form. The Poles would seek to tailor their positions to EU policies, while working to ensure a successful chairmanship for Finland and to avoid major conflicts that would prevent consensus on the declaration. Tactically, Emmel acknowledged that the Poles were unsure how to balance Western desires for a strong statement on issues like Georgia against Russia's opposition to the slightest implied criticism of its actions during and after the August conflict. Emmel implied that Poland would welcome and support a forceful U.S. role but would not take the lead vis-a-vis Russian initiatives.

¶3. (C) On the proposed European security treaty, Poland agreed with the U.S. that the Russians needed to flesh out their ideas. The Poles also believe that Moscow should fulfill its current CFE obligations and commit to continued respect for and compliance with all existing OSCE principles as the basis for any new future security arrangement. Emmel added that the U.S. and Canada should be included in this arrangement; otherwise, it would be pointless for Europeans even to begin a discussion with a resurgent Russia bent on regaining lost influence in the region. Emmel emphasized that if Poland could not exclude the possibility of an OSCE summit on the issue next year, it would insist on receiving more details in advance from Moscow.

¶4. (C) Emmel predicted that ministers are unlikely to reach consensus on a statement renewing OSCE members' commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Russia's preference is for a simple, straightforward mention of the UDHR. Warsaw will oppose efforts to change current election-observance methodology and procedures, or to reduce ODIHR's autonomy. Emmel said Foreign Minister Sikorski planned to address this issue during the conference.

¶5. (C) COMMENT: Warsaw may be too concerned about reaching consensus that would permit a ministerial declaration, but on the whole, the Poles will support U.S. positions. However, they will pick their spots when it comes to leading opposition to Russian initiatives, in line with their carefully calibrated positions in recent EU meetings (Ref B). The Poles will take on Russian positions on essential issues

when they believe they have a chance to influence the outcome, but the GoP will continue to avoid any impression -- one largely created by the preceding Law and Justice (PiS) government -- that they are reflexively and gratuitously "anti-Russian."

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